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Kurzfassung: Es existiert eine Fülle an Auflistungen von Terroristengruppen, zusammengestellt von Staaten und 
Staatenverbünden. Die Liste der Europäischen Union enthält derzeit 44 solcher Gruppen. Die vorliegende Studie analysiert die 
Motive dieser Gruppen, um daraus Kommunikationsstrategien abzuleiten, wie diesen zu entgegnen sei. Dazu wird eine 
dreigliedrige Typologie nach Waldmann (2001) zugrunde gelegt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass ausschließlich religiös motivierter 
Terrorismus lediglich bei fünf der 44 analysierten Gruppen anzutreffen ist. Die meisten Gruppen (n=20) legen nationalistisch-
separatistische Motive an den Tag; 19 Gruppen beziehen sich auf sozial-revolutionäre Motive. Es wird vorgeschlagen, je nach 
Motiv eine unterschiedliche rhetorische Gegenstrategie zu entwerfen, die spezifisch auf die jeweils identifizierten motivationalen 
und Identität generierenden Faktoren eingeht beziehungsweise diese widerlegt.
Abstract: States and international organizations have compiled lists of a great variety of terrorist groups. The current European 
Union list includes 44 entities. This study analyzes the underlying motives of the terrorist organizations named in this list. In 
order to understand the groups’ motivations and consequently be able to advise on methods of countering them with 
communication strategies, we employ a three-item typology provided by Waldmann (2001). The results show that only five of 
the 44 groups were religiously motivated to commit terrorism. Most of the groups (n=20) had nationalist-separatist motives, 
and 19 groups displayed social-revolutionary motives. Based on the respective motives, differing counter-terrorism strategies 
are proposed, e.g., developing rhetorical counter-narratives that address and reduce the groups’ motivational and identity-
generating characteristics. 
 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
In efforts to prevent terrorism, it is vital to understand the phenomenon and the communicative, symbolic 
character of terrorist acts. Through their actions, terrorists try to broadcast a certain message and communicate 
their guiding interests and priorities. In an audio-tape from January 2010, Al-Qaeda head Osama bin Laden 
announced: “‘If it were possible to carry our messages to you with words, we wouldn’t have carried them to you 
with planes’” (as reported by Walid, 2010). Corlett (2003) attributes terrorism to the demand for political, social, 
economic, or religious change. Independently of the primary goals, terrorism is also driven by several subordinate 
motives. In this article, we therefore try to answer the following research question: 
According to which motives can the terrorist entities listed by the European Union be categorized?  
A motive is the underlying cause of a given behavior, and the sum total of motives is called “motivation.” Thus, in 
the theory of motivation and emotion, causal attributions play a key role (Weiner, 1985). Motivation consists of a) 
an aspiration for efficacy and b) organization for goal attainment (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2010). These two 
characteristics are found in all human undertakings. Motive research distinguishes between implicit motives (such 
as internalized cultural aspects) and explicit motives, as expressed, e.g., in public statements. This study 
investigated motives made explicit in various ways, for instance in founding charters. Motive research is a 
multidisciplinary field, including inter alia psychology and criminology (Kehr, Thrash & Wright, 2011; Vecchi, Van 
Hasselt & Angleman, 2013). Unfortunately, too little attention has been focused on the conceptual classification 
and empirical investigation of terrorist groups’ motives and ways to counter them using rhetorical communication 
strategies. 
Terrorism takes many forms, and terrorists act for a variety of reasons. Terrorist entities pursue various different 
goals and have different backgrounds. To understand the terrorists’ messages – with the aim of dissuading 
individuals from resorting to terrorism and deterring terrorist acts – we must understand the specific motives and 
interests of terrorist entities. This paper therefore not only provides insight into definitions and triggers of 
terrorism, but also discusses the backgrounds and objectives of the 44 entities currently listed as terrorist 
organizations by the European Union. By classifying the entities’ motives according to the types of terrorism 
identified by Waldmann (2001), the paper reveals the common objectives and backgrounds of contemporary 
terrorism. This classification is relevant for efforts to frustrate terrorist recruiting strategies – which in most cases 
aim at arousing specific motivations – by means of rhetorical counter-strategies. 

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This paper has six sections. The first describes the study’s relevance. The second discusses various definitions of 
terrorism. We then compare these to the EU definition of terrorism, since this study focuses specifically on the EU 
terrorism list. Fourth, we explain the choice of the Waldmann typology to categorize the terrorist groups on the 
EU list. We then present the study’s results in detail before concluding with a discussion and proposals for 
possible rhetorical counter-narratives. 
 5HOHYDQFHRIPRWLYDWLRQEDVHGFRXQWHUWHUURULVPPHDVXUHV
Because governmental institutions like the European Union are interested in finding measures for countering 
terrorism, they try to identify active terrorist groups, but often neglect a comprehensive examination of the 
terrorist groups’ different backgrounds and motives. However, as this study shows, terrorists’ motives should be 
taken into consideration when developing counter-terrorism strategies. Hillebrand (2012), who investigates 
European counter-terrorism networks with a focus on police measures, writes: “Yet many of the EU’s CT 
[counter-terrorism; the authors] actions are of a rather administrative and regulative manner. Prominent 
examples concern the EU-US exchange of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data as well as the creation of terrorist 
lists and the subsequent freezing of financial assets of listed terrorist suspects or ‘donors’.” (Hillebrand 2012, 6) 
EU politicians are encouraged not to disseminate a discourse of fear, threat and administrative security measures 
in the media (cf. Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2008), but rather to offer matter-of-fact presentations and/or discussions 
of reasoning on the motives, causes and development of terrorism. The alternative discourse that politicians 
ought to bring to the media should not be based on “a culture of fear” (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2008: 6), but rather 
on motives of refuting terrorist messages. Furthermore, the Internet offers manifold possibilities for governments 
to directly communicate their counter-terrorism narratives. Narratives, in this context, are understood as the 
elements that constitute discourse. “Discourse is a category that belongs to and derives from the social domain, 
and text is a category that belongs to and derives from the linguistic domain. The relation between the two is one 
of realization: Discourse finds its expression in text.” (Kress 1985: 27) Thus, a concept of narratives should 
underlie the counter-terrorism discourse that finds expression, e.g., in the statements of the EU or its respective 
member states.  
It is not enough to develop measures that only treat the symptoms (terrorist acts, violent groups), but instead, 
the goal should be to develop methods of communicating anti-terrorist motives. We need to treat the underlying 
causes of the “malady,” not just relieve its symptoms. Therefore, it is important to categorize the listed groups 
according to their motivational drives. Relying on his list of varieties of counter-terrorism, Crelinsten (2014: 10-
11) concludes:  
Counterterrorism cannot be merely reactive or coercive, otherwise it risks creating a bunker 
mentality, triggering resentment and backlash that risks promoting terrorist recruitment as a result, 
and missing the next new development. It must therefore be proactive, looking ahead and trying to 
out-smart the terrorist, and plan ahead, thinking preventively. It must also be persuasive, 
convincing terrorists to abandon their destructive paths and supporters and sympathizers to seek 
other, non-violent ways to achieve their goals. 
His concrete suggestions will be presented in the discussion section of this article. 
 7KHQHYHUHQGLQJSUREOHPRIGHILQLQJWHUURULVP
Although terrorism is not a new phenomenon, no comprehensive, universally accepted definition exists 
(Waldmann, 2001). Hirschmann (2003) concludes that almost no term is as diverse and controversial as 
“terrorism,” and political positions often influence the choice of definition. The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism 
Research includes a selection of more than 250 definitions that emphasize different attributes (Easson and 
Schmid, 2013).  
This paper focuses on non-state terrorism. Therefore, “terrorism” is conceptualized here as an attack on political 
authorities or a state and its institutions. Waldmann (2001) characterizes terrorism as an act of violence against a 
political order. These acts are distinguished by arbitrariness and brutality, intended to arouse fear but also create 
sympathy and willingness to support the terrorists’ goals. Furthermore, terrorists plan and organize their attacks 
clandestinely. As terrorist groups are usually not strong enough to occupy and control a territory or to openly 
challenge a regime, operating illegally and in secrecy seems to be their only realistic option (Waldmann, 2001). 
Provocation is another common tactic, in which a weak individual or group challenges a superior and more 
powerful foe by making sudden surprise attacks and violating social norms (Waldmann, 2001). The weaker 
party’s aim is to provoke the stronger to resort to violence in self-defense, hoping thereby to convince the public 
that the state is brutal and unjust, and the attacker is the real victim of injustice. This paper, however, does not 
focus on military defense, but rather on communicative counter-strategies.  
Corlett (2003) provides a definition of terrorism similar to Waldmann’s (2001): 
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Terrorism is the attempt to achieve (or prevent) political, social, economic, or religious change by 
the actual or threatened use of violence against other persons or other persons’ property; the 
violence (or threat thereof) employed therein is aimed partly at destabilizing (or maintaining) an 
existing political or social order, but mainly at publicizing the goals or causes espoused by the 
agents or by those on whose behalf the agents act; often though not always, terrorism is aimed at 
provoking extreme counter-measures which will win public support for the terrorists and their goals 
or causes. (Corlett, 2003: 19-20) 
Taken together, the definitions of Corlett (2003) and Waldmann (2001) show that terrorist acts promote a 
message: Through the use of violence, terrorists seek publicity, aim to create awareness of a certain issue, and 
try to persuade a government to change its policies. Thus, terrorist acts have a symbolic character. Their purpose 
is not killing, kidnapping, or destruction for its own sake, but rather to gain attention (Waldmann, 2001; see also 
Hirschmann, 2003; Balagangadhara & De Roover, 2010). Schmid (2013b) therefore defines terrorism as a 
combination of violence and communication. Terrorists want to make their motives known to the public. Although 
the terrorist’s message is generally addressed to a government (in the case of non-state terrorism), innocent 
civilians are often the ones directly affected by the terrorists’ acts (Schmid, 2013b; Waldmann, 2001; 
Balagangadhara & De Roover, 2010).  
 7HUURULVWJURXSVOLVWHGE\WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ
In order to choose a relevant set of terrorist groups for categorizing according to the Waldmann typology of 
motivations, the European Union list of terrorist groups was used because of its currency, accessibility and 
European focus. We find a gap in current research, as scholars usually examine only US lists and counter-
strategies (The Council of the European Union, 2013. For a critical perspective on the influence of terrorism lists, 
cf. Kaleck, 2011). The Council of the European Union (2001: 93) defines terrorist acts as:  
intentional acts, which … may seriously damage a country or an international organization … with 
the aim of: (i) seriously intimidating a population, or (ii) unduly compelling a Government or an 
international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or (iii) seriously 
destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of 
a country or an international organization. 
In its definition, the EU emphasizes the terrorists’ objective to force/constrain a government to take/refrain from 
certain actions, and the perspective is clearly oriented toward non-state terrorist groups (see also Baker-Beall, 
2014). The definition also accentuates the terrorists’ aim of political, social, economic or constitutional change 
and thus takes into account the variety of motivations of the different terrorist organizations. The European 
Union’s list of terrorist groups includes only organizations that have already committed or threatened to commit 
terrorist acts, or which support such actions; for example by providing other terrorist entities with financial or 
technological resources (The Council of the European Union, 2001). Therefore, the list does not include groups 
that promulgate extremist ideologies or seek radical changes, but do not engage in terrorist activities.  
Another advantage of relying on the EU list is its currency. The list of terrorist groups is reviewed and revised at 
least every six months. Groups that are no longer active can be deleted from the list and new organizations 
added. The last revision prior to this study was made in July 2013. At that time, the EU identified 26 
organizations as terrorist entities according to articles 2, 3, and 4 of the EU Common Position (2001/931/CFSP) 
on the use of specific measures to combat terrorism. This means not only that these entities are designated as 
terrorist groups, but also that their financial assets, funds, and economic resources have been frozen and may 
not be made available to benefit any group designated by the EU as a terrorist organization (Council of the 
European Union, 2001). 
Besides these 26 entities, the EU identified 18 terrorist organizations to which only article 4 of the EU Common 
Position 2001/931/CFSP applies. The article states: 
Member States shall, through police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the framework of 
Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, afford each other the widest possible assistance in preventing 
and combating terrorist acts. To that end they shall, with respect to enquiries and proceedings 
conducted by their authorities in respect of any of the persons, groups and entities listed in the Annex, 
fully exploit, upon request, their existing powers in accordance with acts of the European Union and 
other international agreements, arrangements and conventions which are binding upon Member States. 
(The Council of the European Union, 2001: 94) 
As these 18 groups lack the characteristics named in articles 2 and 3 of the Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, the 
European Union has not taken measures regarding their organizations’ financial assets, funds, and economic 
resources.  
Although the European Union offers a definition of terrorism and lists terrorist organizations, it does not give 
detailed information on the respective groups. Categorizing the different forms of terrorism can help to order the 
data and make possible a practical application to the political and social realms, thus enabling governments to 
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develop counter-narratives. Categorizing the listed terrorist groups based on Waldmann’s (2001) typology can 
help to identify similarities between their organizations, reveal the main motives of contemporary terrorism, and 
increase our knowledge about the motivations that lie behind terrorist attacks and recruitment strategies. This 
can provide helpful information for counter-terrorism programs, such as developing responses that weaken the 
respective motivations. 
 :DOGPDQQ¶VW\SRORJ\RIPRWLYDWLRQ
Typologies of terrorism can contribute to greater conceptual clarity, help to order complex data and can be 
practically applied to both the political and social realms (Marsden and Schmid, 2013). There are a variety of 
typologies of terrorism, differentiating for example domestic and international terrorism (Hirschmann, 2003), the 
execution of terrorist actions (Marsden and Schmid, 2013), non-state and vigilante terrorism (Schmid and de 
Graaf, 1982), or terrorist group organizational characteristics and goal structures (Piazza, 2009). Rapoport (2004) 
examined aspects of the history of non-state terror and concluded that there were four “waves”: the anarchist, 
anti-colonial, New Left and religious waves. Rapoport (2004: 47) states that, “a different energy drives each,” 
although he does not use the term “motive.”  
For the objectives of motive research, however, the present paper uses a typology suggested by Waldmann 
(2001), and similarly by Straßner (2004). In Waldmann’s (2001) typology, the term “terrorism” is interpreted 
according to the definition explained above and refers to attacks against political authorities or a state’s system of 
governance. It focuses on the terrorists’ motives and self-conceptions, takes note of nationalistic and social-
revolutionary groups, and considers religiously motivated terrorism independent of political objectives. The 
typology is based on self-images and ideology as sources of terrorists’ motivations, as well as on objectives 
arising from a specific socio-historical background that also influences terrorists’ actions. Straßner (2004) deals 
exclusively with insurgent terrorism. 
Waldmann’s typology was introduced in parts in the late 1980s (e.g., Waldmann, 1989) and was fully developed 
by the late 1990s/early 2000. We take into account past and current criticism of the typology and suggestions for 
modified or new typologies made by other researchers in the field (e.g., Wilkinson, 1987; Farnen, 1990; Paletz & 
Vinson, 1992; Liebl, 2006). However, a discussion of the academic debate on the suitability of particular terrorism 
typologies would go beyond the scope of this paper. 
Waldmann (2001) and Straßner (2004) delineate three categories of terrorism: social-revolutionary terrorism, 
ethnic-nationalistic terrorism, and religious terrorism. In the case of social-revolutionary terrorism, terrorists seek 
political and social revolution based on Marxist/Leninist/Maoist ideals (Waldmann, 2001). Social-revolutionary 
terrorists aspire to create a society in which every citizen is equal and has the same rights and opportunities; 
therefore, radical changes would have to be made in politics, as well as in the economy, administration, and 
culture (Waldmann, 2001) 
Social-revolutionary terrorist organizations rely expressis verbis, as well as implicitly, on Karl Marx 
and subsequent ideologies. They strive for a radical reformation of political and societal reality, with 
which they associate armed struggle against capitalism, imperialism and global inequality and 
injustice. (Straßner, 2004: 360) 
The second category, ethnic-nationalistic terrorism, describes terrorist groups that represent a minority or a 
population group held to be oppressed. The main objective of ethnic-nationalistic terrorists is an independent 
state or at least some degree of political autonomy (Waldmann, 2001). Often terrorists justify their goals with 
appeals to their historical background, claiming that their people had a better life before they were dominated by 
a hostile regime (Waldmann, 2001). They further emphasize their culture, which they view as threatened, e.g., 
by modernization, immigration, or the increasing power of the centralized state (Waldmann, 2001). According to 
Straßner, the main characteristic of ethnic-nationalistically motivated terrorist groups results from the fact that 
“the clientele of these terrorists consists of an oppressed, ethnically allegedly definable minority mostly located in 
a superordinate state system perceived as an adversary. The core concern of ethnic-nationalistically motivated 
terrorists thus lies primarily in the creation of an own state entity for the minority that feels oppressed” (Straßner, 
2004: 361). 
Religious terrorism, the third category, is often related to religious fundamentalism. Although this type of 
fundamentalism can be found in the history of each of the three chief monotheistic world religions, the currently 
most violent form is that of Islamist terrorists (Waldmann, 2001). Religiously motivated terrorists often share a 
millenarian vision. They further criticize the global trend of modernization and secularization and therefore dream 
of founding a society on religious principles (Waldmann, 2001). In regard to religiously motivated terrorism, 
Straßner points to a “currently observable tendency of commingling religious motivation with social-revolutionary 
and ethnic-nationalist contents (Palestine)” (Straßner, 2004: 361). 
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In the following section, we will apply the presented typology of three major motivations to the European Union 
lists. We will discuss the limitations of the study before presenting our results in a comparative overview, as well 
as in the respective motivation categories. 
 5HVXOWV
To obtain sufficient information about the terrorist groups’ motives, we made an extensive exploratory literature 
review. The qualitative approach included gathering information from document collections, the groups’ own 
(founding) documents (e.g. the IRA green book or the Hamas founding charter) and websites (e.g. 
pkkonline.com), scholarly journals (e.g., Perspectives on Terrorism). As well we used as the reports of 
newspapers and broadcasters in Europe, North America and Asia (e.g. BBC, CNN, German quality newspapers 
such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung or Die Zeit). Important sources for our research 
on the motives, histories, and activities of the groups were the databases of research institutes. These included 
the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism of the University of Maryland, 
governmental institutions like the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), as well as non-governmental 
organizations like the US-based Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) or the Mackenzie Institute in Canada. 
Already at this stage, we want to call attention to the limitations of the study:  
x Most of the material that we accessed and gathered was in English. This certainly limits the range of 
documents and perhaps even prevents a deeper understanding of the terrorists’ motives, which would 
be better traceable if researchers studied texts by terrorists in their native language.  
x Moreover, changes in motives can occur over time. We have tried to follow these changes, but we have 
mainly found only minor changes, while the original underlying motive remained the same.  
x Also, we found many cases of groups that could be classified in more than one category, for example 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In these cases, we assigned a group to the 
category it shared the most similarities with, and we will explain below why we placed them in the 
particular category. However, in order to indicate the multi-motive background of certain groups, Figure 
1 illustrates intersections. Furthermore, Rapoport (2004), who tried to classify terrorist groups into four 
“waves” (see above), admits that most groups show a dominant, but not just one unique “feature” 
(Rapoport, 2004: 47). For example, he places the Tamil Tigers in the “religious wave” category, because 
they are largely Hindus. However, having examined the declaration of motivational factors on the LTTE 
website and their recruitment strategies, we cannot agree with this classification. 
x Another problem arose with organizations that do not explicitly state their own objectives related to 
terrorism, but instead support other terrorist groups, for instance through funding. For example, the al-
Aqsa Foundation and Stichting al Aqsa portray themselves as charitable organizations dedicated to 
achieving humanitarian goals, but in fact support Hamas terrorist activities. In such cases, the particular 
organization was assigned to the same category as the terrorist group it supports. 

Figure 1: Motive intersections  
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Based on the information gathered about the terrorist organizations’ motives, we categorized the groups as 
shown in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 presents the categorization of the 26 entities to which articles 2, 3, and 4 of the 
Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply, whereas Table 2 shows the 18 terrorist organizations to which only 
article 4 of the Common Position 2001/931/CFSP applies. The latter are entities based within the European Union.  
Based on our definition of “motives” (see above), in the following sub-sections we will examine the various 
different terrorist groups and outline the decisions leading to the classifications made above. 
6RFLDOUHYROXWLRQDU\WHUURULVP (WKQLFQDWLRQDOLVWLFWHUURULVP 5HOLJLRXVWHUURULVP
Communist Party of the Philippines, 
including New People’s Army (NPA) 
Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO) Al-Takfir and Al-Hijra 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistan-PKK) 
Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade Gama’a al-Islamiyya 
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National 
Liberation Army, NLA) 
Al-Aqsa e.V. øslami Büyük Do÷u AkÕncÕlar Cephesi 
(IBDA-C) 
Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) 
Babbar Khalsa Hizballah Military Wing and all units 
reporting to it, including the External 
Security Organization 
Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-
General Command) 
Hamas, including Hamas-Izz al-Din al-
Qassem 
Hofstadgroep 
Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de 
Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia-FARC) 
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)  
Devrimci Halk KurtuluЬ Partisi-Cephesi 
(DHKP/C) 
Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 
Development 
 
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path-SL) International Sikh Youth Federation 
(ISYF) 
 
 Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF)  
 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)  
 Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)  
 Stichting Al Aqsa  
 Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan (TAK)  
Table 1: Categorization of the terrorist groups designated by the European Union following articles 2, 3, and 4 of Common 
Position 2001/931/CFSP 
6RFLDOUHYROXWLRQDU\WHUURULVP (WKQLFQDWLRQDOLVWLFWHUURULVP
Cooperativa Artigiana Fuoco ed Affini-Occasionalmente 
Spettacolare (Artisans’ Cooperative Fire and Similar-
Occasionally Spectacular) 
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) 
Nuclei Armati per il Comunismo (Armed Units for 
Communism) 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna / Tierra Vasca y Libertad (Basque 
Fatherland and Liberty-E.T.A.) 
Cellula Contro Capitale, Carcere i suoi Carcerieri e le sue Celle 
(Cell Against Capital, Prison, Prison Warders and Prison Cells-
CCCCC) 
Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) 
Epanastatikos Agonas (Revolutionary Struggle) Orange Volunteers (OV) 
Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre 
(Antifascist Resistance Groups First of October-G.R.A.P.O.) 
Real IRA 
Solidarietà Internazionale (International Solidarity) Red Hand Defenders (RHD) 
Brigate Rosse per la Costruzione del Partito Comunista 
Combattente (Red Brigades for the Construction of the 
Fighting Communist Party) 
Ulster Defence Association / Ulster Freedom Fighters 
(UDA/UFF) 
Epanastatiki Pirines (Revolutionary Nuclei)  
Dekati Evdomi Noemvri (Revolutionary Organization 17 
November) 
 
Brigata XX Luglio (Twentieth of July Brigade)  
Federazione Anarchica Informale (Unofficial Anarchist 
Federation-F.A.I.) 
 
Table 2: Categorization of the terrorist groups designated by the European Union following article 4 of Common Position 
2001/931/CFSP
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 6RFLDOUHYROXWLRQDU\WHUURULVP
Within this motivation group, terrorist organizations often originate in communist parties (e.g. the NPA in the 
Communist Party of the Philippines, FARC in the Colombian Communist Party, G.R.A.P.O. as the armed wing of 
the Communist Party of Spain [Reconstituted], DHKP/C as an offshoot of the Devrimci Yol, a splinter group of the 
Turkish People’s Liberation Party-Front). Often these groups can be traced back to student revolutionaries of the 
1960s and 1970s (like PKK) or other left-wing intellectuals committed to the spread of Maoist ideology. Sendero 
Luminoso, for example, was founded by Abimael Guzmán, a philosophy professor and lecturer at the University in 
Ayacucho (Schmid 2013a). The NLA was founded by urban left-wing intellectuals and oil industry labor unionists, 
and was later joined by Catholic clergy committed to Liberation Theology. As well, the Nuclei Armati per il 
Comunismo had its roots in working classes that felt exploited and not fairly represented by the government. 
Therefore, Nuclei Armati per il Comunismo primarily attacked companies that employed illegal workers.  
Social-revolutionary terrorist groups are far-left oriented and based on the ideologies of Marxism, Leninism and/or 
Maoism. The Columbian NLA, for example, adopts the Marxist ideologies that motivated Fidel Castro and Che 
Guevara in their 1959 overthrow of the Cuban government. These groups fight for revolutionary change of 
society, politics and economy, and can conceive of no means other than armed struggle and the overthrow of the 
nation state and its status quo politics in order to found a new state based on socialism and communism. Thus, 
many of these groups emphasize their wish for total equality among all citizens. For instance, the PKK claims to 
have strengthened the social role of women: “Whereas before the women of Kurdistan were ignored and 
oppressed, today they are leading the way in all the social and political spheres of the struggle and daily life” 
(Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, 2011). The PKK further stresses the role of the proletariat and demands that Kurdish 
society should be based on the principles of communism, so that it will become “an alternative to capitalist 
modernity” (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, 2011). 
Social-revolutionary groups are opposed to imperialism, globalization, capitalism, and police violence. Thus, they 
attack political and military installations, diplomatic personnel and facilities, political leaders and institutions, 
national security and military officials, banks, government and office buildings. Or they extort concessions from 
foreign investors, businessmen and foreign-owned (often US-owned) companies within their country. They 
furthermore try to block “capitalist” construction projects and want to ban capitalist companies from their 
countries. Except for the PFLP, suicide bombings are not at all a common tactic of these groups. Usually, the 
terrorist groups are dissatisfied with the policies of their respective countries for labor relations and the economy, 
as well as foreign relations. FARC, for example, is strongly influenced by Marxist ideals and claims that it protects 
Colombian citizens against the rule of elites, neo-imperialism, and repressive violence by the Colombian 
government and paramilitary forces. FARC further criticizes the monopolization of resources by multinational 
corporations and the influence of the United States on Colombian affairs (National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013h). Other groups, such as the DHKP/C, criticize modern Western 
societies and are strongly opposed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and even the EU, as well as 
to the US, because they believe that their governments are controlled by Western imperialists. Some groups, like 
CCCCC and Solidarietà Internazionale, express solidarity with incarcerated members of their networks, and 
proclaim as a goal the liberation of these members. The groups are also closely committed to anarchist and 
antifascist ideologies. 
There have been reports of alliances between the groups, for example between the NLA and FARC. The 
Federazione Anarchica Informale (F.A.I.) maintains close relations with other Italian anarchist groups such as 
CCCCC, Brigata XX Luglio, and Solidarietà Internazionale. The F.A.I. links all these groups and functions as an 
umbrella organization. Many of the groups are based either in Europe (most of them in southern European 
countries like Italy, Spain or Greece) or Latin America (NLA, FARC, Sendero Luminoso), although the Latin 
American groups have a much larger membership.  
For the religiously influenced social-revolutionary groups operating in the Middle East and fighting to take back 
Palestine for the Palestinians, categorizing these groups is more difficult (as in fact that they combine all three 
motives; cf. Figure 1). We have chosen to base our classification on the most important argument with which 
they try to characterize their struggle. For the PFLP, the second largest faction of the PLO, e.g., the liberation of 
Palestine is more of a subordinate goal. In fact, the PFLP seems to be influenced mainly by Marxism-Leninism: 
the organization wants to combine communist ideology with Arab left-wing nationalism in order to eliminate all 
Western influences from the Middle East (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism, 2014). Left-wing Arabian nationalism is a movement that seeks to unite all Arab nations to form a 
single state, with the destruction of Israel perceived as necessary to unite the Arab nations and establish 
communism. The organization’s members do not want to destroy Israel because they feel oppressed; instead 
they want to unite many countries and, based on the ideals of Marx and Lenin, create a nation in which every 
citizen is equal (http://www.pflp-pal.org/strategy.html). 
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We classify other groups operating in the Middle East in the category of ethnic-nationalistic terrorism. They feel 
oppressed by Israel and demand the creation of a liberal, autonomous Palestine. ANO, for example, seeks to 
destroy Israel as a nation and to liberate Palestine. The founder, Abu Nidal, was primarily driven by anger at the 
expulsion of his family from Palestine in 1948, during the Israeli War of Independence (National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013a). The group has opposed any peace negotiations and 
believes that the total liberation of Palestine can only be achieved by armed struggle (National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013a). Strong nationalism can be ascribed to all of the Middle 
Eastern groups. They seek to expel the Israelis from Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank to create a 
Palestinian nation-state. Therefore, the organizations’ attacks are mainly targeted at Israeli settlers and security 
forces in the mentioned regions, but also at Palestinians who are perceived to support Israel (National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013b). On the other hand, they provide 
assistance to Palestinian refugees.  
Also placed in this category are groups that disguise themselves as “international charity associations” to raise 
funds for Hamas, and thus agree with Hamas’ ethnic-nationalistic motivation: e.g., the Holy Land Foundation for 
Relief and Development, the Al-Aqsa Foundation and Stichting Al Aqsa. They have collected donations in 
mosques, Islamic centers, and during demonstrations on the Arab-Israeli conflict (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
2002). They are also active in recruitment and providing logistical support (US Department of the Treasury, 
2007). 
Here, again, the problem arises of categorizing Middle Eastern groups due to their multiple motives. The Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs’ Brigade, for example, features a mosque and Islamic script in their logo, but the creation of an Islamic 
state is not an explicit goal of the group (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism, 2013b). Similarly, in its slogan and charter, Hamas refers to Allah and accentuates Jihad – i.e., war or 
struggle against those who do not believe in Allah. Although the group draws on Islamic themes, its main 
objective is the liberation of Palestine from Israel, which characterizes Hamas more as an ethnic-nationalistic 
terrorist group than a religious one. Piazza (2009: 66) states that Hamas “is functionally a national-liberation 
movement.” And although Hizbul Mujahideen seeks to spread Islam in Jammu and Kashmir, its ethnically-
motivated activities primarily concentrate on winning the political independence of Jammu and Kashmir from 
India, seeking to integrate them with Pakistan. As one can legitimately question why we have not assigned more 
“Islamist” groups to the religious motive category, we further justify our choice with a last example: the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Even though the PIJ perceives the Arab-Israeli conflict as of a religious nature and 
promotes Jihad (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013g), the 
organization does not display the usual characteristics of religious terrorism: The PIJ’s objectives are neither the 
spread of religion nor a society based on religious principles. In an interview with a delegation from the World 
Federation of Scientists in 2009 (Atran and Axelrod, 2010), PIJ leader Ramadan Abdullah Shallah emphasized that 
the organization’s motives are not of a religious nature: “We don’t want a state based on religious identity” (Atran 
and Axelrod, 2010: 4). Unlike religious terrorists, the PIJ does not demand a state based on Islam: 
I have no problem living with the Jewish people. We have lived together in peace for centuries. And if 
Netanyahu were to ask if we can live together in one state, I would say to him: ‘If we have exactly the 
same rights as Jews to come to all of Palestine … then we can have a new language, and dialogue is 
possible.’ (Atran and Axelrod, 2010: 8) 
Instead of religious goals, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad focuses on achieving political independence by 
overthrowing the state of Israel (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 
2013g). As the members of the PIJ perceive the Palestinians as oppressed by Israel and therefore fight for 
autonomy, the organization, in our eyes, practices a form of ethnic-nationalistic rather than religious terrorism. 
Other demands for independent states and political autonomy are voiced by organizations of Sikhs: “Babbar 
Khalsa”, the Khalistan Zindabad Force and the ISYF fighting against India in order to establish a state called 
“Khalistan.” The LTTE feels oppressed by the Singhalese, thus they are struggling against the government of Sri 
Lanka to gain independence and establish their own Tamil nation. TAK aspires to create a Kurdish state, the ETA 
a Basque one, and violent Irish Republican nationalist terrorist groups fought against British Army and Northern 
Ireland Security Forces, seeking to unite Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. Of course, most of the 
groups’ members belong to the respective ethnic group (Basque, Kashmiri, etc.). To justify their violent 
nationalist struggle, the groups often appeal to their own history and culture, which differ from the dominant 
national ones. Members killed in the struggle are revered as saints and martyrs who were oppressed and treated 
unjustly by the national state. 
An exception to the groups listed above – whose objective is their own nation-state – are loyalist terrorist groups 
that want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom and oppose a united Ireland (Kushner, 2003). 
Although they do not want to establish their own state, but rather maintain the status quo as part of the UK and 
were originally differentiated on the basis of religion – Irish nationalist groups are Catholic, UK loyalist groups are 
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Protestant –, these groups can still be seen as ethnic-nationalistic organizations. The UDA, Orange Volunteers, 
and LVF want to maintain the current status quo for Northern Ireland and remain part of the UK. They condemn 
Republican nationalist terrorist groups and the Republic of Ireland for interfering in Northern Ireland’s internal 
affairs, and for the attempted “gallicization” of Northern Ireland, which they perceive as a threat to the country’s 
British culture. Therefore, they have tried to destabilize the peace process and block a political settlement.  
Also in this category, we can see the origin of some organizations as splinter groups of political parties, albeit less 
so than in the social-revolutionary terrorism category: The Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, for example, was established 
as a military arm of Al Fatah (Anti-Defamation League, 2013). Hizbul Mujahideen was founded in 1989 as the 
militant wing of the Islamic Pakistani party “Jamaat-e-Islami” (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism, 2013e). And Palestinian Islamic Jihad emerged as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood. There is often co-operation among the groups, e.g., between Khalistan Zindabad Force and Hizbul 
Mujahideen. Additionally, many of the ethnic-nationalist groups have influential diasporas – as well in Western 
countries including Canada, the USA, and European states – that are active in funding and recruitment (e.g. the 
Tamils and Sikhs). The ISYF was even founded in the United Kingdom as an international branch of the All India 
Sikh Students’ Federation (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2001a). 
Regarding the date of foundation, there is no specific time-frame for the emergence of the groups in this 
category. Most sprang to life after an outrage committed against their respective ethnic group by those in 
national power. Regarding targets, ethnic-nationalistic terrorist groups are typically of two types: Some operate 
only within their respective national borders; others have been active in terrorist operations in many countries. 
The ANU, for example, is allegedly responsible for attacks in 20 different countries, including the US, UK, Israel, 
Pakistan, and Turkey. The Middle Eastern groups that fight for an autonomous Palestinian state independent of 
Israel aspire to destroy Israel and thus target all institutions, states, officials, politicians, or religious buildings 
linked to it. ANO, for example, hijacked a Pan American World Airways flight and was responsible for a shooting 
spree at a synagogue. Further, accessible public spaces like bus-stops, restaurants, and shopping malls are 
frequent targets of terrorist attacks – often suicide attacks. 
Babbar Khalsa detonated two bombs in movie theaters in Delhi; the Hizbul Mujahideen attack Indian politicians 
and security forces in the Kashmir region; the ISYF and the Khalistan Zindabad Force target Indian Hindus, 
symbolic figures like the Deputy Superintendent of Police (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2001b), and also Sikhs 
perceived as adversaries. The LTTE has attacked politicians, airplanes, banks and Buddhist religious sites, mostly 
on Sri Lankan territory. TAK contends that the Turkish government finances the oppression of the Kurds, mainly 
with income from tourism; thus, the organization’s terrorist operations concentrate on disrupting tourism in 
Turkey by attacking Turkish and foreign civilians in popular tourist areas. In sum, we can say that the groups 
target their “ethnic” enemies, i.e. the groups they think oppress or threaten them. In this way, they vent their 
motivational feeling of ethnic oppression.  
 5HOLJLRXV7HUURULVP
Even though the main share of media coverage, political debates, and even research deals with religious 
terrorism, surprisingly few groups are assigned to this category. Those listed are all Islamic fundamentalist 
terrorist groups. They operate on an international level: examples include the train bombings in Madrid, the 
murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands, and bombings at US or French military or government 
facilities like consulates, embassies or military bases. These attacks are of a symbolic nature, intended to draw 
attention to and condemn the nation represented by the targets. Except for the Hofstadgroep – whose name was 
coined by the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service and later adopted by the media (Transnational 
Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, 2008) – all the groups allude to Islam or Allah in their names, e.g., 
“Islamic Group” (Gama’a’s al-Islamiyya) or “Islamic Great Eastern Raiders’ Front” (IBDA-C). 
The groups’ motives stem from a rejection of and opposition to Western globalization, along with modern norms 
and values that the groups’ members consider incompatible with Islamic law. Al-Takfir and Al-Hijra, for example, 
see Islamic society as mired in a phase of weakness. Therefore, the group began to migrate (to mountain caves 
or special rented rooms) and isolate itself in an effort to avoid influences it perceived as negative. In unpopulated 
areas, they strove to create an Islamic community that would realize their understanding of an ideal Islamic 
society. Gama’a al-Islamiyya, on the other hand, wants to transform Egypt into an Islamic state and fights the 
Egyptian government by attacking security forces, government officials, Coptic Christians, tourists, and Egyptians 
who it perceives to oppose Islam (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 
2013c). The IBDA-C seeks the foundation of a Sunni Islamic federated state in the Middle East in which everyone 
obeys Islamic commandments and laws. Members claim that secularism in Turkey is illegal and call for 
reestablishing the Caliphate. Judaism, Christianity, and Western societies are perceived as evil (National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013f). Likewise, the dominant goal of the 
Hezbollah Military Wing is to establish a Shi’ite theocracy in Lebanon. The Hezbollah Military Wing wants to 
destroy Israel and fights against influences from Western societies or other religions (National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013d). 
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These organizations espouse a very strict interpretation of Islam, emphasize the importance of Jihad, and some 
strive for total withdrawal from modern society. They want to exclude non-Muslims from the public sphere in 
these countries. Their objectives are based only on Islam, and the groups do not pursue political goals, e.g. 
political liberation. Some are reportedly financed by Middle Eastern states. In this category there are also 
examples of terrorist motives that stem not from the poor working classes, but instead adopt the ideas of radical 
intellectuals: Al-Takfir and Al-Hijra were founded by an agricultural engineer (Gleis, 2005), and Gama’a Al-
Islamiyya started as an Egyptian student organization. 
 'LVFXVVLRQDQG2XWORRN5KHWRULFDOFRXQWHUQDUUDWLYHV
The European Union – like many other institutions – is concerned about terrorism and has taken measures to 
counter it. For instance, European Union agencies have been commissioned to identify active terrorist groups 
based on the terrorism definition provided by the Council of the European Union. This definition is similar to many 
researchers’ understanding of terrorism. However, the European Union provides no information on the motives 
and goals of the different terrorist organizations. But, as presented above, the terrorists’ actions are heavily 
influenced by their motivational ideology, objectives, and socio-historical background. Thus, to understand the 
terrorists’ activities, these aspects must also be considered. 
Consequently, the purpose of this paper was to give insights into the motives and ideologies of the 44 
organizations listed in July 2013 as terrorist entities by the Council of the European Union. Thereby we wanted to 
contribute to reducing the “lack [of] a systematic comparison of the aims sought by organizations” (Rapoport, 
2004: 73). As the organization of goal attainment is a crucial factor of motivational drives (Heckhausen & 
Heckhausen, 2010), we could deduce the motives from a thorough review of primary and secondary literature, 
such as terrorist groups’ websites and databases. For more clarity regarding the groups’ objectives and to reveal 
trends, the organizations were categorized using terms from Waldmann’s and Straßner’s typology, which is based 
on terrorists’ motives and differentiates three forms of terrorism: ethnic-nationalistic, social-revolutionary, and 
religious terrorism. Categorizing the entities identified by the European Union reveals that the majority of the 
terrorist organizations are of an ethnic-nationalistic nature: 20 groups, i.e., almost half of the listed entities, 
display characteristics of this type of terrorist motivation. Almost as many (19 entities) display social-revolutionary 
motives. In contrast, only five organizations are actually motivated by religious goals. This is consistent with 
Rapoport’s observation that “nationalism or separatism is the most frequently espoused cause” (Rapoport, 2004: 
65). 
Some groups displayed characteristics of two categories. For instance, several groups appealed to Islam or 
Sikhism, but in most cases, religion was primarily an attribute the members of the group had in common rather 
than a driver of their terrorist attacks. Often these groups pursued a nation independent of a state currently 
perceived as an oppressor. In general, this objective was not based on religious motivation, but on pure 
nationalism and historical or cultural aspects. This finding supports an observation already made by Hirschmann 
(2003), who stated that many terrorist entities use religion mainly to justify their actions, whereas their goals and 
motives are mainly of a political nature. This result can be explained by the role of religion in societies: Religion 
establishes a social framework and is able to create a stronger bond between people than could a political 
ideology (Hirschmann 2003). Therefore, appealing to religious faith increases the legitimacy of the terrorists’ 
actions and helps to recruit new members and supporters. Another finding of this study is that many of the 
presented terrorist entities are active in Israel and focus on the liberation of Palestine. This underlines the critical 
situation of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the need for continuing political dialogue and actions.  
In sum, it can be said that although a large number of terrorist organizations appeal to religion, the main driving 
forces behind terrorism are still ethnic-nationalism and the demand for a social revolution. When countering 
terrorism, these aspects should be considered as the specific motives influencing not only why, but also how a 
group operates – in which realm and with which targets – and thus help to achieve a better understanding of 
terrorism. Knowing the specific motives of a terrorist group can only be a starting point for a more complex 
analysis of terrorists’ communication and – taking into consideration their rhetoric, target audiences, 
communication channels and communication contents – the development of a strategic communication concept 
for countering terrorism. This again can help to improve political measures like precautions, prevention, or 
dialogues with terrorists, which governments have so often neglected (Baker-Beall, 2014). Of course, it remains 
to be seen whether this analysis gives any justification to argue for the effectiveness of any specific rhetorical 
counter-narratives. Yet, it certainly is a start to take into account the various motives of terrorism in anti-terrorist 
communication and to address not only the “symptoms,” but also the “malady” and causes underlying the 
founding of violent groups. 
As we have already discussed the limitations of this study (see above), we now want to emphasize the 
implications of our categorization for anti-terrorism policymaking. Until now, EU anti-terrorism discourse does not 
focus on motive-based counter-strategies (Baker-Beall, 2014). Crelinsten (2014) identified five different 
approaches to counter-terrorism: coercive, proactive, persuasive, defensive, and long-term. We suggest that our 
findings can contribute to persuasive counter-terrorism, which “involves understanding and dealing with the ideas 
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that underpin the use of terrorism in social and political life. This has ideological, political, social, cultural and 
religious aspects” (Crelinsten, 2014: 6). Whereas other models such as the coercive approach “rely on the state’s 
monopoly of the use of violence, i.e., the exercise of hard power” (Crelinsten, 2014: 2), the persuasive approach 
explicitly includes a communication model as one of the most important tools in counter-terrorism measures. 
Crelinsten’s “persuasive communication model” of terrorism response speaks of the distribution of information to 
different target audiences. The communication narratives have to be “expressive and symbolic as well as 
instrumental” (Crelinsten, 2014: 6), and in our case have to be designed according to the three different motives 
identified in our study. That means, for example, that even though Hamas and the PFLP pursue quite similar 
goals (i.e., the liberation of Palestine), persuasive counter-terrorism efforts should be structured differently. For 
Hamas, national security and government experts could employ an inter-ethnic understanding counter-narrative, 
whereas to fight the PFLP an anti-socialist counter-narrative would be more suitable. These counter-narratives 
could be promulgated via comments on websites that are frequently used by the respective terrorist group’s 
followers. Our research showed that the goals of terrorist groups can be the same (e.g., the liberation of 
Palestine, the creation of a Kurdish state), even though their motivation may be different (PFLP vs. Hamas; PKK 
vs. TAK). Consequently, the response to and communication with them must also be different. Whereas the PKK 
is primarily driven by the desire to establish communism and thus claims to aspire to achieve equality for all 
citizens, TAK does not emphasize such social-revolutionary goals. Therefore, to deter potentially interested 
individuals from joining these groups, the EU should write their posts (e.g. on Social Media websites of PKK) not 
in an explicitly anti-communist frame but should instead emphasize the achievements and benefits of democracy. 
These differences in motives have sometimes even been the reason for the breakup of groups and the creation of 
splinter groups, as, for example, is the case with Republican groups (e.g., the IRA) in Northern Ireland. 
In order to describe the EU’s strategic communication in more detail, we will now focus on the differences 
between reflective and non-reflective rhetoric. This is important, as terrorists or individuals interested in terrorist 
groups’ ideology often do not feel up to discussing certain assumptions. As Lederman states, “Specifically, the 
respondent will need to decide to what degree the opposition’s rhetoric should be reflected, and which features of 
it should be mirrored. Those decisions may together constitute a strategy which may, broadly, be termed 
reflective or non-reflective” (Lederman, 1991: 42). Therefore, to directly and openly contradict ideological 
assumptions is not viewed as the best and most effective persuasion technique. It is rather “an outmoded and 
inappropriate model of communication that is poorly adapted to the task of persuading audiences already hostile 
to the messenger and disenchanted with the message” (Corman et al., 2008: 5). More suitable would instead be 
non-reflective rhetoric that tries to focus on motives that in fact counter the ones inherent to the terrorist group 
but does not try to “discredit” them. In the case of Hezbollah, for example, the EU should not attack and 
denigrate Islam as such, but rather focus on the benefits of secular state systems and religious pluralism. This, as 
Palmerton says, will have an effect on the actions of terrorist groups, because “the rhetoric of terrorism is created 
in large part by those responding to terrorist acts” (Palmerton, 1988: 106). 
Finally, it must be noted that the above findings are based only on information about the terrorist entities listed 
by the European Union in July 2013. As the Council of the European Union reviews its list at least every six 
months, new groups may be added in the future and thus their motives should also be analyzed and categorized. 
Besides, as discussed above, the motives, objectives and ideology of a terrorist organization may change over 
time. Therefore, a regular review of the different groups’ classification is suggested, preferably including 
reference to documentary evidence in various different languages. With this in mind, we hope that the general 
categorization provided by this study can guide future research on terrorist motives. 
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